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i. intrOdUCtiOn
 For this symposium about the overuse of dispositive motions in employment 
discrimination cases, this article provides an empirical analysis of summary judgment 
practice in Equal Pay Act (EPA or the “Act”) cases on the front lines of the trial 
courts. As every first-year law student should know, a court may grant summary 
judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 only if there is “no genuine 
dispute as to any material fact.”1 Courts have recognized that because of the “fact 
intensive nature” of the equal pay inquiry, “summary judgment will often be 
inappropriate” for equal pay claims.2 Although—in theory—most equal pay claims 
should survive summary judgment, an analysis of 500 recent EPA cases shows that—
in practice—federal district courts summarily dismiss most equal pay claims.
 Resolution of equal pay claims involves two significant factual questions. First, at 
the prima facie stage, the fact-finder must determine whether the plaintiff and a 
comparator employee received different compensation for “equal work on jobs the 
performance of which requires equal skills, effort, and responsibility, and which are 
performed under similar working conditions.”3 Second, if the plaintiff satisfies the 
prima facie standard, discrimination is presumed and the burden of persuasion shifts 
to the employer to prove that the pay disparity actually resulted from (and is not 
theoretically justified by) one of four affirmative defenses: “(i) a seniority system; (ii) 
a merit system; (iii) a system which measures earnings by quantity or quality of 
production; or (iv) a differential based on any other factor other than sex.”4
 The parties in equal pay cases typically dispute the key material facts at issue: 
Are the two jobs substantially equal in terms of the skill, effort, and responsibility 
required for the work? What actually caused the pay disparity and is that defense 
credible? Even though grants of summary judgment in equal pay cases should be rare 
given the material factual disputes that pervade such issues, it has become more 
difficult over the past decade for plaintiffs in pay discrimination cases to survive 
summary judgment.
 In a prior study of federal reported appellate cases involving equal pay claims, I 
found that there was a dramatic decrease in plaintiff success rates on equal pay claims 
since the Act’s passage, partly because of the impact of summary judgment practice.5 
For example, employees prevailed on only 35% of federal equal pay claims during the 
period from 2000 to 2009, down from an employee success rate of 55% in the 1990s, 
52% in the 1980s, and 59% in the 1970s.6 Appeals of summary judgment decisions 
were rare in the first two decades of the Act’s existence—only six out of the one 
1. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
2. Brobst v. Columbus Servs. Int’l, 761 F.2d 148, 156 (3d Cir. 1985).
3. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (2006).
4. Id.
5. Deborah Thompson Eisenberg, Shattering the Equal Pay Act’s Glass Ceiling, 63 SMU L. Rev. 17, 34 
(2010).
6. Id. at 33.
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hundred reported equal pay appellate cases between 1970 and 1989 involved an 
appeal of a summary disposition. Beginning in 1990, however, most of the equal pay 
cases on appeal involved summary judgment decisions by the district court (fifty-
eight out of ninety-six cases), rather than an appeal from a trial verdict.7 More 
troubling, appellate courts rarely overturned grants of summary judgment by the 
district courts, affirming 92% of them.8 In other words, the study of reported 
appellate equal pay cases suggested that district courts were granting most employer 
motions for summary judgment on equal pay claims, and that appellate courts were 
affirming nearly all of those dismissals. But my prior analysis of how federal appellate 
courts treated equal pay claims in reported cases begged the question of what was 
really happening on the front lines of the federal district courts.
 This article fills that gap, taking a peek below the appellate level to evaluate how 
trial courts are handling employer motions for summary judgment on equal pay 
claims. I compiled and analyzed a database containing all federal district court 
decisions—both published and unpublished—that considered whether to grant 
summary judgment to an employer on an equal pay claim over a little more than a 
decade, from 2000 to 2011.9 The analysis shows that, with a handful of exceptions, 
dismissing equal pay claims at the summary judgment stage is the modus operandi 
for most federal courts. Courts granted 68% of employer motions for summary 
judgment on equal pay claims—meaning that only about one-third of equal pay 
claims survived the summary judgment “starting gate.” In many cases, judges 
improperly granted summary judgment when disputes of material fact existed 
regarding the prima facie standard of “equal work” and the credibility of the 
employer’s defenses. In other cases, the very structure of the Equal Pay Act—
especially courts’ overly strict interpretation of the “equal work” standard and liberal 
application of the “factor other than sex” defense—caused the claim to fail.
 The article proceeds as follows: Part II describes the methodology used for the 
case study. Part III.A examines summary judgment grant rates based on a number of 
basic demographics: whether the case was published or unpublished; whether the 
case involved multiple plaintiffs; and whether the plaintiff was male or female. Part 
III.B analyzes whether summary judgment grant rates varied based on the geographic 
location of the court or the political party or gender of the deciding judge. Part IV 
provides an overview of the summary judgment outcomes in equal pay cases and 
examines the potential reasons for the high rate of summary dismissals. Part V 
concludes with thoughts about how to reverse the trend of trial by motion rather 
than by jury in equal pay cases.
7. Id. By comparison, appeals of equal pay cases rarely involved summary judgment decisions in the 1970s 
(one summary judgment appeal; thirty-eight trial appeals) and 1980s (five summary judgment appeals; 
fifty-six trial appeals). In the 1990s, the appeals involved three motions for judgments or directed 
verdicts, twenty-eight summary judgment decisions, and twenty-two trials.
8. Id.
9. The study covers eleven years, but is sometimes referred to as covering a “decade” throughout this 
article.
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ii. MEthOdOLOgY and databasE OVErViEW
 The database for this case study included all published and unpublished cases in 
the Westlaw database that involved consideration of a summary judgment motion on 
a claim under the EPA from January  1,  2000 to December 31, 2011. The final 
database included 500 equal pay claims: 363 unpublished decisions and 137 published 
decisions. This is the largest database of equal pay claims ever compiled and analyzed. 
 I included unpublished decisions because most courts do not publish their 
summary judgment decisions in equal pay cases. As Elizabeth Schneider and Nancy 
Gertner point out in their article for this symposium, the failure of courts to publish 
their decisions—especially their denials of employer motions for summary 
judgment—can skew employment discrimination case law to focus on the “bad 
claims” for which summary judgment was granted.10
 An overview of the database broken down by year is reflected in Table 1.
Table 1: Total Claims in the Database, Unpublished and Published
Year Total Unpublished Total Published Total 
2000 20 9 29
2001 21 9 30
2002 13 20 33
2003 20 7 27
2004 22 11 33
2005 43 7 50
2006 41 2 43
2007 53 11 64
2008 39 11 50
2009 29 15 44
2010 30 14 44
2011 32 21 53
Totals 363 137 500
 Each case was reviewed carefully for sixty different criteria about the court and the 
outcome. The criteria consisted of four general categories of information about the equal 
pay claims: (1) all basic demographic information about the case;11 (2) information about 
10. Elizabeth M. Schneider & Hon. Nancy Gertner, “Only Procedural”: Thoughts on the Substantive Law 
Dimensions of Preliminary Procedural Decisions in Employment Discrimination Cases, 57 N.Y.L. Sch. L. 
Rev. 767, 777 (2012–2013).
11. The demographic case information included: case citation, the court district division, the state district, 
the federal appellate circuit in which the district fell, whether the decision was published, the year of 
the decision, and whether multiple plaintiffs asserted claims in the same case.
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the plaintiff;12 (3) information about the deciding judge;13 and (4) the disposition on the 
equal pay summary judgment motion, including the court’s specific findings about the 
two key stages in the analysis: the plaintiff ’s prima facie showing of “equal work” and 
the employer’s affirmative defenses for the pay disparity. The quantitative information 
about the outcome in each case was recorded in an Excel database for analysis.
 I tracked ten criteria related to the prima facie case. The first and most basic was 
whether the court found that the plaintiff had satisfied the EPA’s prima facie 
standard. In addition, I recorded the reasons the court may have found the prima 
facie standard insufficient, such as an improper comparator; limitations issues; no 
proof of a pay disparity; no showing of substantially equal effort, responsibility, or 
skills among the compared positions; or a lack of similar working conditions for the 
comparators. I also assessed whether the court cited or analyzed the critical statutory 
prima facie factors of “skill, effort, and responsibility” in the decision.
 I evaluated twelve categories related to the employer’s affirmative defenses. First, 
I recorded the broad affirmative defense asserted by the defendant: merit system, 
seniority system, or a factor other than sex. These defenses were broken down into 
smaller segments to track the court’s treatment of different kinds of justifications for 
pay disparities, including: performance, a collective bargaining agreement, red circle 
rates,14 a factor other than sex, the length of service of the plaintiff, “market forces” 
or business judgment, a formal salary plan, prior or negotiated salary of the plaintiff 
and her comparator(s), and the qualifications of the plaintiff.
 The database contained thirty-five collective action cases involving multiple plaintiffs. 
The EPA does not permit class actions.15 Instead, each plaintiff must separately “opt in” 
to a collective action.16 This makes it more difficult for plaintiffs to join together in a 
group action to challenge systemic pay discrimination by an employer.17 The collective 
action structure can raise the costs of discovery and discourage claims by plaintiffs who 
may be too frightened to go on public record with a lawsuit against her employer.18
12. The plaintiff information included: the plaintiff ’s position, the category of the work, the type of 
executive function, if any, the plaintiff performed, whether the plaintiff was male or female, and 
whether the case involved claims by multiple plaintiffs.
13. This included: the judge’s name and gender, the president who appointed the judge, and the political 
party of the appointing president.
14. According the EPA’s regulations, “[t]he term ‘red circle’ rate is used to describe certain unusual, higher 
than normal, wage rates which are maintained for reasons unrelated to sex.” 29 C.F.R. § 1620.26(a) 
(2012). The regulation provides an example in which an employer transfers an employee who develops a 
disability or illness to a less demanding job but at the same pay rate, which may be “red circled” as non-
discriminatory because it was not based on sex, even if that employee is now being paid more than other 
employees who perform the same task. Id.
15. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2006).
16. Id.
17. For a discussion of the differences between a class action and collective action, and the disincentives for 
plaintiffs to join a collective action, see Deborah Thompson Eisenberg, Wal-Mart Stores v. Dukes: 
Lessons for the Legal Quest for Equal Pay, 46 New Eng. L. Rev. 229, 269 (2012).
18. Id. at 270. 
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their decisions—especially their denials of employer motions for summary 
judgment—can skew employment discrimination case law to focus on the “bad 
claims” for which summary judgment was granted.10
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10. Elizabeth M. Schneider & Hon. Nancy Gertner, “Only Procedural”: Thoughts on the Substantive Law 
Dimensions of Preliminary Procedural Decisions in Employment Discrimination Cases, 57 N.Y.L. Sch. L. 
Rev. 767, 777 (2012–2013).
11. The demographic case information included: case citation, the court district division, the state district, 
the federal appellate circuit in which the district fell, whether the decision was published, the year of 
the decision, and whether multiple plaintiffs asserted claims in the same case.
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 The largest collective action in the database involved eight plaintiffs.19 In most of 
the collective action cases (twenty-four), the courts analyzed the plaintiffs’ claims as 
a whole unit.20 In eleven cases, the court analyzed each of the plaintiffs’ claims 
separately.21 For these eleven cases, I tracked the treatment of each claim, resulting in 
some cases appearing in the database multiple times. For the analysis that follows, I 
therefore refer to the results for each “claim” rather than the results in each case.
 Because EPA claims are often filed together with other types of Title VII 
discrimination claims, I also tracked how the court ruled on any Title VII counts 
filed in the same action. This allowed for the analysis of subtle differences in the 
court’s treatment of Title VII and EPA pay claims. The prima facie standards and 
burdens of proof for pay discrimination claims under Title VII and the EPA are 
slightly different.22 Whereas the EPA has a stricter “equal work” prima facie standard, 
the Title VII prima facie threshold is a more lenient standard of “similarly situated.” 
The same affirmative defenses under the EPA can be used by employers to defeat 
19. EEOC v. Cash & Go, Ltd., No. Civ.A. C-04-416, 2005 WL 1527663 at *1 (S.D. Tex. June 28, 2005).
20. Hawks v. Forest River, Inc., No. 3:09-CV-532-CAN, 2011 WL 5434241 (N.D. Ind. Nov. 8, 2011); 
Mothershead v. Bd. of Sch. Comm’rs, Civ. Action Nos. 10-0038-KD-C, 10-0285-KD-C, 2011 WL 
5076521 (S.D. Ala. Oct. 26, 2011); Moore v. Freeman, No. 1:00-CV-72, 2001 WL 34079300 (E.D. 
Tenn. July 23, 2011); Kennedy v. Va. Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 781 F. Supp. 2d 297 (W.D. Va. 
2011); Bush v. Orange Cnty. Corr. Dep’t, 597 F. Supp. 2d 1293 (M.D. Fla. 2009); Ebbert v. Nassau Cnty., 
No. 05-CV-5445 (FB)(AKT), 2009 WL 935812 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2009); Harris v. Auxilium Pharm., 
Inc., 664 F. Supp. 2d 711 (S.D. Tex. 2009); Detholoff v. Buchanan, No. CV 05-140-PCT-MHM, 2008 
WL 4277643 (D. Ariz. Sept. 16, 2008); Gonzalez v. Caviness Beef Packers, Ltd., No. 2:07-CV-33-J, 
2008 WL 2600010 (N.D. Tex. July 1, 2008); Galvan v. Caviness Packing Co., 546 F. Supp. 2d 371 (N.D. 
Tex. 2008); Byra-Grzegorczyk v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 572 F. Supp. 2d 233 (D. Conn. 2008); 
Defurio v. Elizabeth Forward Sch. Dist., CA No. 05-1227, 2007 WL 2752176 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 19, 2007); 
Prewett v. Ala. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 533 F. Supp. 2d 1160 (M.D. Ala. 2007); Cox v. Office of Att’y 
Ethics of the Supreme Court of N.J., Civ. No. 05-1608(AET), 2006 WL 3833470 (D.N.J. Dec. 29, 2006); 
Ekekhor v. AON Serv. Corp., No. 05C99, 2006 WL 2349982 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 9, 2006); Little v. Cobb 
Cnty., No. 1:03-CV-3973WSD, 2006 WL 839401 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 30, 2006); Dillow v. Wellmont Health 
Sys., No. 2:03-CV-451, 2005 WL 3115424 (E.D. Tenn. Nov. 21, 2005); Moncrief v. Daro Realty, Inc., 
No. Civ.A. 03-762GK, 2005 WL 1119794 (D.D.C. Apr. 28, 2005); Fagen v. Iowa, 301 F. Supp. 2d 997 
(S.D. Iowa 2004); Alford v. Cosmyl, Inc., 209 F. Supp. 2d 1361 (M.D. Ga. 2002); Kozlowski v. Fry, 238 
F. Supp. 2d 996 (N.D. Ill. 2002); Rinaldi v. World Book, Inc., No. 00C3573, 2001 WL 477145 (N.D. Ill. 
May 3, 2001); Albrant v. Heartland Foods, Inc., No. C03-4031-PAZ, 2004 WL 1854203 (N.D. Iowa 
Aug. 19, 2004); Arthur v. Coll. of St. Benedict, 174 F. Supp. 2d 968 (D. Minn. 2001).
21. Price v. N. States Power Co., Civ. No. 09-1921(DWF/LIB), 2011 WL 338451 (D. Minn. Jan. 31, 
2011); Rollins v. Ala. Cmty. Coll. Sys., 814 F. Supp. 2d 1250 (M.D. Ala. 2011); Randall  v. Rolls-Royce 
Corp., 742 F. Supp. 2d 974 (S.D. Ind. 2010); Finch v.  Xavier Univ., 689 F. Supp. 2d 955 (S.D. Ohio 
2010); Prise v. Alderwoods Grp., Inc., 657 F. Supp. 2d 564 (W.D. Pa. 2009); Hernandez v. Caviness 
Packing Co., No. 2:07-CV-142-J, 2008 WL 2404963 (N.D. Tex. June 13, 2008); EEOC v. EGS Elec. 
Grp., LLC, Civ. Action No. H-05-2945, 2007 WL 869529 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 21, 2007); Arnott v. 
Archway Mktg. Servs., Civ. No. 05-2173(DSD/JJG), 2007 WL 274831 (D. Minn. Jan. 26, 2007); 
EEOC v. Cash & Go, Ltd., No. Civ.A. C-04-416, 2005 WL 1527663 (S.D. Tex. June 28, 2005); Velez 
v. QVC, Inc., 227 F. Supp. 2d 384 (E.D. Pa. 2002); Lederer v. Argonaut Ins. Co., No. 98 CV 3251, 
2000 WL 126933 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 28, 2000).
22. See Brewster v. Barnes, 788 F.2d 985, 987 (4th Cir. 1986) (holding defendant liable for pay discrimination 
under the Equal Pay Act, but not under Title VII).
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Title VII claims.23 In addition, plaintiffs in Title VII disparate treatment cases bear 
the ultimate burden of proving that the employer intentionally discriminated in the 
terms and conditions of employment based on sex. In contrast, if a plaintiff makes a 
prima facie showing under the EPA, the burden of persuasion shifts to the employer 
to justify the pay disparity, and intentional discrimination need not be shown.24
 I also recorded the outcome on any other type of non-pay Title VII discrimination 
claim in each case, such as sexual harassment, failure to hire or promote, retaliation, 
or other types of disparate treatment.25 I tracked this for two reasons: first, I wanted 
to know whether plaintiffs were perhaps prevailing on summary judgment for some of 
their discrimination claims, even if they failed to prevail on the EPA claim. Second, I 
hoped to identify cases in which the EPA pay discrimination claim may have been 
added as a “kitchen sink” approach to pleading—in other words, where the heart of 
the case involved some other type of discriminatory treatment and the plaintiff lacked 
sufficient evidence of pay discrimination when she filed the complaint.
iii.  QUAntitAtiVE rEsULts: sUMMAry dispOsitiOn Of EpA cLAiMs is thE 
MOdUs OpErandi
 This Part describes the quantitative results of the study. Section III.A describes 
the overall rates of summary judgment dispositions on equal pay claims. Part III.B 
examines the database from different angles to determine the rates of summary 
disposition based on court geography, the political party of the president who 
appointed the judge, and the gender of the judge.
 A. The General Picture
 For the period from January 1, 2000 to December 31, 2011, federal district courts 
granted summary judgment against 68% of equal pay claims (341 out of 500), and 
denied 32% of summary judgment motions (159 out of 500), which is reflected in 
Chart 1 below. The summary judgment grant rate was similar, but slightly lower, in 
published opinions (66%, or 90 out of 137 claims) than in unpublished decisions 
(69%, or 251 out of 363 claims).
23. Cnty. of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 168–71 (1981) (holding that the EPA’s affirmative 
defenses apply to Title VII pay discrimination claims).
24. See Brinkley-Obu v. Hughes Training, Inc., 36 F.3d 336, 344 (4th Cir. 1994) (explaining the differences 
between the burdens of proof for claims under the EPA and Title VII); see also Sinclair v. Auto. Club of 
Okla., Inc., 733 F.2d 726, 729 (10th Cir. 1984) (“Discriminatory intent is not an element of a claim 
under the [EPA].”).
25. The other types of Title VII claims tracked for summary judgment disposition, if applicable to the case, 
included: hostile work environment, failure to promote, failure to train, failure to hire or rehire, terms 
and conditions of employment (where a more specific allegation is not discernable from the decision), 
constructive discharge, demotion or suspension, termination or discharge, retaliation, disparate 
treatment, failure to appoint or reappoint, pattern or practice of discrimination, disparate impact, and 
sexual harassment. For each of these types of claims, the column recorded “Y-G” if the plaintiff asserted 
that type of claim and the court granted summary judgment and “Y-D” if the plaintiff asserted that type 
of claim and the court denied summary judgment.
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Chart 1: Overall Rate of Summary Judgment Grants and Denials on Equal Pay Claims
 Judges did not grant summary judgment as frequently on equal pay claims 
brought together in one collective action. In those cases in which multiple plaintiffs 
filed pay discrimination claims against the same employer, the court denied 56% of 
summary judgment motions and granted 43%. For the 443 cases in which individual 
plaintiffs asserted claims, courts denied 29% of summary judgment motions and 
granted 71% of summary judgment motions. The higher rate of summary judgment 
denials in EPA collective action cases suggests that judges may be more likely to find 
factual disputes precluding summary judgment26—or at least have more doubt about 
an employer’s asserted defenses—when multiple plaintiffs bring equal pay claims 
against the same employer in one case.27
26. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Va. Polytechnic Inst. & St. Univ., 781 F. Supp. 2d 297, 301–02 (W.D. Va. 2011) 
(“While Virginia Tech has proffered evidence indicating that it made its pay determinations without 
regard to gender, Plaintiffs’ evidence that (1) several male comparators earned higher salaries than 
Plaintiffs’ and (2) that Virginia Tech made these salary determinations based, in some small part, on 
subjective criteria would allow a reasonable jury to infer that Virginia Tech’s actions were illegal. Because 
there is a chance, however large or small it might be, that a reasonably [sic] jury could find in Plaintiffs’ 
favor on the EPA claim, summary judgment is improper.”); Harris v. Auxilium Pharm., Inc., 664 F. 
Supp. 2d 711, 731 (S.D. Tex. 2009) (finding that the employer’s justifications for pay disparities were not 
“altogether convincing” and that fact issues precluded summary judgment on EPA claim). 
27. Of course, this hypothesis is undermined a bit by the decision in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 
2541 (2011), in which the U.S. Supreme Court expressed doubt that an employer’s discretionary pay and 
promotion system could promote a common policy of pervasive discrimination for a class of 1.5 million 
current and former Wal-Mart employees. See Eisenberg, supra note 17. But Wal-Mart involved a mammoth 
national class action under Title VII, not a collective action under the EPA. Wal-Mart also focused solely 
on the procedural issue of class certification and did not address the merits of plaintiffs’ claims.
Summary Judgment On Equal Pay Claims Overall
sJ denied 
159 claims 
32%
sJ granted 
341 claims 
68%
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 In every year of the last decade, courts granted summary judgment on a majority 
of equal pay claims. But the ratio of grants and denials has not been static over time. 
The decade started in 2000 with roughly an equal percentage of summary judgment 
motions denied (48%) as granted (52%). The percentage of summary dispositions 
shot up starting in 2002, with 73% granted, and reached highs of 78% of summary 
judgment motions granted in 2008 and 77% granted in 2010. The percentage of 
summary dispositions started to decline again in 2011, falling back to 64%.
 Chart 2 plots the percentage of summary judgment motions granted and denied 
for equal pay claims in each of the past eleven years. The dip down to a 56% grant rate 
and a 44% denial rate in 2005 may be partly explained by a collective action brought 
by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission in EEOC v. Cash & Go, Ltd., in 
which a magistrate judge denied summary judgment on the claims of eight area 
managers.28 The volume of claims in this one case increased the summary judgment 
denial rate. If the case is counted as one denial—rather than eight separate denials of 
the eight plaintiffs’ claims—the results for 2005 would be more consistent with other 
rates: summary judgment denials in 33% of cases and grants in 67% of cases.
Chart 2: Percentage of Summary Judgment Motions Granted and Denied Each Year, 
2000–2011
 Less than 1% of the claims in the database (forty-eight claims) were brought by 
male plaintiffs. Summary judgment was granted on 85% of the claims of male plaintiffs, 
with summary judgment denials for only seven claims. Out of the 452 claims brought 
by female plaintiffs, summary judgment was granted for 60% (or 300 claims).
28. EEOC v. Cash & Go, Ltd., No. Civ.A. C-04-416, 2005 WL 1527663, at *1 (S.D. Tex. June 28, 2005).
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 In sum, although the decade started with a relatively even split between summary 
judgment denials and grants, the overall rate of summary dismissals of equal pay 
claims has skyrocketed over the past eleven years. The next section examines whether 
summary judgment outcomes vary based on the state or circuit in which the court 
falls, the political party of the President who appointed the judge, or the gender of 
the deciding judge.
 B. Summary Judgment is the Norm Regardless of Court Demographics
  1. Court Geography
 With a few exceptions, federal district courts in all geographic areas granted 
summary judgment on equal pay claims a majority of the time.
 The courts that handled the greatest number of equal pay claims included the 
Northern District of Illinois (thirty-eight claims), the Southern District of New York 
(twenty-seven), the Southern and Northern Districts of Texas (twenty each), and the 
Middle District of Alabama (nineteen). The summary judgment rates for these 
jurisdictions are fairly similar to the overall results, with the glaring exception of the 
dramatically differing rates between the Northern District of Texas, which denied 
summary judgment for 60% of equal pay claims and granted it for 40% of claims, 
and its sister court in the Southern District of Texas, which granted summary 
judgment for 95% of equal pay claims and denied it for only 5% of claims. The 
summary judgment record for these districts is reflected in Table 2.
Table 2: Summary Judgment Disposition in Districts Deciding Greatest Number of 
Equal Pay Claims
Summary Judgment 
Granted
Summary Judgment 
Denied
Total 
Claims
District Number Percent Number Percent
M.D. Ala. 15 79% 4 2% 19
N.D. Ill. 29 76% 9 24% 38
S.D.N.Y. 19 70% 8 30% 27
S.D. Tex. 8 40% 12 60% 20
N.D. Tex. 19 95% 1 5% 20
Total 90 73% 34 27% 124
Because many divisions had fewer than ten cases, I grouped courts together both by 
state and by the federal circuit appellate jurisdiction in which they fell. The district 
courts falling within the Ninth (81%), Fourth (78%), and Eleventh (74%) Circuits 
granted summary judgment on equal pay claims most often. The U.S. District Court 
for the District of Columbia decided only six claims, and granted summary judgment 
on all but one. The district courts falling within the Third Circuit comprised the 
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only group that denied summary judgment motions for a majority of equal pay 
claims, albeit a very slight majority (53% of claims). The district courts within the 
Eighth Circuit had a fairly even ratio in the opposite direction from the Third 
Circuit: denying 42% of summary judgment motions and granting 58%. The results 
by circuit grouping are reflected in Table 3.
Table 3: District Court Summary Judgment Disposition on Equal Pay Claims by 
Federal Circuit
Summary Judgment 
Granted
Summary Judgment 
Denied
Federal 
Circuit 
Number Percent Number Percent Total 
Claims
First 8 73% 3 27% 11
Second 44 72% 17 28% 61
Third 22 47% 25 53% 47
Fourth 25 78% 7 22% 32
Fifth 50 68% 23 32% 73
Sixth 35 69% 16 31% 51
Seventh 50 72% 19 28% 69
Eighth 28 58% 20 42% 48
Ninth 17 81% 4 19% 21
Tenth 14 61% 9 39% 23
Eleventh 43 74% 15 26% 58
D.C. 5 83% 1 17% 6
Total 341 68% 159 32% 500
 If all divisions within each federal district are grouped together, the only two 
states in which federal district courts denied summary judgment on the majority of 
equal pay claims were Iowa (60% denied) and Kansas (56% denied). The states with 
the highest rate of granting summary judgment on equal pay claims were Arizona 
(88%), Louisiana (85%), and Michigan (85%). The breakdown of summary judgment 
disposition by state (including the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico), for those 
states that considered more than five equal pay claims, is reflected in Table 4.
 In sum, although the decade started with a relatively even split between summary 
judgment denials and grants, the overall rate of summary dismissals of equal pay 
claims has skyrocketed over the past eleven years. The next section examines whether 
summary judgment outcomes vary based on the state or circuit in which the court 
falls, the political party of the President who appointed the judge, or the gender of 
the deciding judge.
 B. Summary Judgment is the Norm Regardless of Court Demographics
  1. Court Geography
 With a few exceptions, federal district courts in all geographic areas granted 
summary judgment on equal pay claims a majority of the time.
 The courts that handled the greatest number of equal pay claims included the 
Northern District of Illinois (thirty-eight claims), the Southern District of New York 
(twenty-seven), the Southern and Northern Districts of Texas (twenty each), and the 
Middle District of Alabama (nineteen). The summary judgment rates for these 
jurisdictions are fairly similar to the overall results, with the glaring exception of the 
dramatically differing rates between the Northern District of Texas, which denied 
summary judgment for 60% of equal pay claims and granted it for 40% of claims, 
and its sister court in the Southern District of Texas, which granted summary 
judgment for 95% of equal pay claims and denied it for only 5% of claims. The 
summary judgment record for these districts is reflected in Table 2.
Table 2: Summary Judgment Disposition in Districts Deciding Greatest Number of 
Equal Pay Claims
Summary Judgment 
Granted
Summary Judgment 
Denied
Total 
Claims
District Number Percent Number Percent
M.D. Ala. 15 79% 4 2% 19
N.D. Ill. 29 76% 9 24% 38
S.D.N.Y. 19 70% 8 30% 27
S.D. Tex. 8 40% 12 60% 20
N.D. Tex. 19 95% 1 5% 20
Total 90 73% 34 27% 124
Because many divisions had fewer than ten cases, I grouped courts together both by 
state and by the federal circuit appellate jurisdiction in which they fell. The district 
courts falling within the Ninth (81%), Fourth (78%), and Eleventh (74%) Circuits 
granted summary judgment on equal pay claims most often. The U.S. District Court 
for the District of Columbia decided only six claims, and granted summary judgment 
on all but one. The district courts falling within the Third Circuit comprised the 
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Table 4: District Court Summary Judgment Disposition on Equal Pay Claims by State29
Summary Judgment Granted Summary Judgment Denied
State Number Percent Number Percent Total 
Claims
Alabama 20 74% 7 26% 27
Arizona 7 88% 1 12% 8
Arkansas 5 56% 4 44% 9
Connecticut 4 67% 2 33% 6
D.C. 5 83% 1 17% 6
Delaware 4 57% 3 43% 7
Florida 9 64% 5 36% 14
Georgia 14 82% 3 18% 17
Illinois 33 73% 12 27% 45
Indiana 13 76% 4 24% 17
Iowa 4 40% 6 60% 10
Kansas 4 44% 5 56% 9
Louisiana 11 85% 2 15% 13
Maryland 7 78% 2 22% 9
Michigan 11 85% 2 15% 13
Minnesota 8 62% 5 38% 13
Mississippi 4 50% 4 50% 8
Missouri 9 69% 4 31% 13
New Jersey 4 67% 2 33% 6
New York 39 72% 15 28% 54
Ohio 13 68% 6 32% 19
Oklahoma 5 71% 2 29% 7
Oregon 4 57% 3 43% 7
Pennsylvania 15 44% 19 56% 34
Puerto Rico 5 83% 1 17% 6
South Carolina 5 63% 3 37% 8
Tennessee 8 53% 7 47% 15
Texas 35 67% 17 33% 52
Virginia 7 78% 2 22% 9
Wisconsin 4 57% 3 43% 7
Total 316 68% 152 32% 468
29. Table 4 includes only those states in which the federal district courts considered greater than five equal 
pay claims.
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 District Courts in many states considered five or fewer claims and granted 
summary judgment on every equal pay claim considered, including: California (two), 
Idaho (one), North Carolina (five), New Mexico (one), Nebraska (one), Nevada (one), 
New Hampshire (one), West Virginia (one), and Washington (two). Massachusetts 
considered four claims, with an even split between summary judgment denials and 
grants. Colorado and South Dakota district courts each considered two claims, 
granting summary judgment on one claim and denying it on the other. The district 
courts in Utah and Kentucky granted summary judgment on three claims, and 
denied summary judgment once.30
 In sum, with the exception of the districts of Iowa and Kansas, federal courts 
across the nation granted summary judgment on a majority of equal pay claims. As 
the Honorable Mark Bennett of the U.S. District Court for the District of Iowa has 
explained, too many federal judges are inappropriately granting summary judgment 
“in a shocking number of employment discrimination cases.”31 It is no surprise that 
Judge’s Bennett’s district—the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of 
Iowa—has one of the highest summary judgment denial rates, given his professed 
“love, respect, and passion for trial by jury.”32 If other federal judges followed Judge 
Bennett’s example of reserving the resolution of disputed material facts for the jury, 
equal pay claims likely would survive summary judgment more often.
  2. Political Party of the President Who Appointed the Judge 
 Prior research has found that Republican-appointed district court judges were 
significantly more likely to grant summary judgment on Title VII employment 
discrimination claims.33 This was not true for the cases in this study, which showed 
that district court judges appointed by both Republicans and Democrats granted 
summary judgment on a majority of equal pay claims. As reflected in Table 5, district 
court judges appointed by Republican Presidents granted summary judgment on equal 
pay claims slightly less frequently—for 67% of claims, than judges appointed by 
Democrats, who granted summary judgment against 72% of equal pay claims. Federal 
magistrate judges denied summary judgment more often than Article III federal 
district court judges, granting summary judgment on 58% of equal pay claims.
30. Any state that is not mentioned did not have any cases in the database. The states that did not have any 
equal pay cases in the database were: Alaska, Hawaii, Maine, Montana, North Dakota, Rhode Island, 
Vermont, and Wyoming.
31. Hon. Mark W. Bennett, Essay: From the “No Spittin’, No Cussin’ And No Summary Judgment” Days of 
Employment Litigation to the “Defendant’s Summary Judgment Affirmed Without Comment” Days: One 
Judge’s Four-Decade Perspective, 57 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 685 (2012–2013). 
32. Id. at 707. 
33. John Friedl & Andre Honoree, Is Justice Blind?: Examining the Relationship Between Presidential 
Appointments of Judges and Outcomes in Employment Discrimination Cases, 38 Cumb. L. Rev. 89 (2008) 
(finding in random sampling of district court Title VII decisions that plaintiffs in employment 
discrimination cases have a substantially greater chance of surviving summary judgment if the judge 
was appointed by a democratic President rather than a republican President, with republican appointees 
more likely to favor employers).
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Table 5: District Court Summary Judgment Disposition on Equal Pay Claims by 
Political Party of the Appointing President
Summary Judgment 
Granted
Summary Judgment 
Denied
Appointing 
Party
Number Percentage Number Percentage Total 
Claims
Republican 172 67% 83 33% 255
Democrat 134 72% 51 28% 185
Total 306 70% 134 30% 440
 Table 6 breaks down summary judgment disposition on equal pay claims by the 
appointing President. With the exception of judges appointed by Ronald Reagan and 
Barack Obama, granting summary judgment was the general practice for judges 
regardless of their appointing President. Particularly telling are the similar summary 
judgment rates among judges appointed by George W. Bush (71% granted), Bill 
Clinton (72% granted), and George H.W. Bush (70% granted). These judges came to 
the bench during and after the 1990s—a time when the use of summary judgment in 
employment discrimination cases began to skyrocket because of two significant 
developments. First, the U.S. Supreme Court decided a trilogy of cases in 1986—
Matsushita v. Zenith Radio Corp.,34 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,35 and Celotex Corp. v. 
Catrett36—which “provided impetus and encouragement to district courts to grant 
summary judgment more frequently.”37 Second, Congress amended Title VII in 1991 
to permit jury trials and compensatory damages, which increased Title VII filings 
and judicial hostility toward employment discrimination claims.38 Federal judges and 
scholars have explained how the confluence of these factors led to an explosion of 
summary judgment practice in the federal courts—making the dismissal of 
employment discrimination cases on summary judgment the general practice rather 
than the exception.39 As former U.S. District Court Judge and Professor Nancy 
34. 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
35. 477 U.S. 242 (1986).
36. 477 U.S. 317 (1986).
37. Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Changing Shape of Federal Civil Pretrial Practice: The Disparate Impact on 
Civil Rights and Employment Discrimination Cases, 158 U. Pa. L. Rev. 517, 537 (2010).
38. Theresa M. Beiner, The Misuse of Summary Judgment in Hostile Environment Cases, 34 Wake Forest L. 
Rev. 71, 72–73 (1999) (arguing that courts became increasingly hostile to Title VII harassment cases 
after filings of such claims increased after 1991); Anand Swaminathan, The Rubric of Force: Employment 
Discrimination in the Context of Subtle Biases and Judicial Hostility, 3 The Modern Am. 21, 26 (2007) 
(discussing judicial hostility toward employment discrimination cases during the 1990s).
39. See Bennett, supra note 31, at 697–700; Patricia M. Wald, Summary Judgment at Sixty, 76 Tex. L. Rev. 
1897, 1941 (1998) (“Its f lame lit by Matsushita, Anderson, and Celotex in 1986, and fueled by overloaded 
dockets of the last two decades, summary judgment has spread swiftly through the underbrush of 
undesirable cases, taking down some healthy trees as it goes.”).
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Gertner has reported, she was even encouraged in her federal judge training to use 
summary judgment to “get rid” of employment discrimination cases.40
 The only group of judges who denied summary judgment more often than they 
granted it were those appointed by Barack Obama, but this set consists of only three 
cases.41 President Obama made the issue of equal pay a priority, making his first 
major piece of legislation the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act.42
Table 6: District Court Summary Judgment Disposition on Equal Pay Claims by 
Appointing President
Summary Judgment 
Granted
Summary Judgment 
Denied
Appointing 
President
Number Percentage Number Percentage Total 
Claims
Barack Obama 1 33% 2 67% 3
George W. Bush 65 71% 26 29% 91
Bill Clinton 103 72% 41 28% 144
George H. W. Bush 51 70% 22 30% 73
Ronald Reagan 41 59% 28 41% 69
Jimmy Carter 28 80% 7 20% 35
Gerald Ford 7 78% 2 22% 9
Richard Nixon 8 62% 5 38% 13
Lyndon Johnson 1 100% 0 0% 1
John F. Kennedy 1 50% 1 50% 2
Total 306 70% 134 30% 440
  3. Gender of the Judge
 As reflected in Table 7, female judges granted summary judgment on equal pay 
claims at a much lower rate (61%) than male judges (70%).43 Female magistrate judges 
denied summary judgment for 65% of claims, as compared to a 33% summary 
40. Hon. Nancy Gertner, Address to the Employment Law Conference, Massachusetts Bar Association (May 
7, 2007) (“When I was a ‘baby judge’ I attended a training session. The trainer was to address employment 
discrimination cases. He began his presentation with: ‘Here’s how you can get rid of these cases. . . .’”).
41. After the study period, federal judges appointed by President Obama granted summary judgment on 
equal pay claims more frequently, granting summary judgment on more than nineteen claims and 
denying summary judgment for at least four claims.
42. Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (2009); see also Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Obama 
Signs Equal-Pay Legislation, N.Y. Times, Jan. 29, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/30/us/
politics/30ledbetter-web.html?_r=0.
43. Table 7 includes all Article III federal district court judges, plus seventeen female federal magistrate 
judges, and forty-three male federal magistrate judges.
Table 5: District Court Summary Judgment Disposition on Equal Pay Claims by 
Political Party of the Appointing President
Summary Judgment 
Granted
Summary Judgment 
Denied
Appointing 
Party
Number Percentage Number Percentage Total 
Claims
Republican 172 67% 83 33% 255
Democrat 134 72% 51 28% 185
Total 306 70% 134 30% 440
 Table 6 breaks down summary judgment disposition on equal pay claims by the 
appointing President. With the exception of judges appointed by Ronald Reagan and 
Barack Obama, granting summary judgment was the general practice for judges 
regardless of their appointing President. Particularly telling are the similar summary 
judgment rates among judges appointed by George W. Bush (71% granted), Bill 
Clinton (72% granted), and George H.W. Bush (70% granted). These judges came to 
the bench during and after the 1990s—a time when the use of summary judgment in 
employment discrimination cases began to skyrocket because of two significant 
developments. First, the U.S. Supreme Court decided a trilogy of cases in 1986—
Matsushita v. Zenith Radio Corp.,34 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,35 and Celotex Corp. v. 
Catrett36—which “provided impetus and encouragement to district courts to grant 
summary judgment more frequently.”37 Second, Congress amended Title VII in 1991 
to permit jury trials and compensatory damages, which increased Title VII filings 
and judicial hostility toward employment discrimination claims.38 Federal judges and 
scholars have explained how the confluence of these factors led to an explosion of 
summary judgment practice in the federal courts—making the dismissal of 
employment discrimination cases on summary judgment the general practice rather 
than the exception.39 As former U.S. District Court Judge and Professor Nancy 
34. 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
35. 477 U.S. 242 (1986).
36. 477 U.S. 317 (1986).
37. Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Changing Shape of Federal Civil Pretrial Practice: The Disparate Impact on 
Civil Rights and Employment Discrimination Cases, 158 U. Pa. L. Rev. 517, 537 (2010).
38. Theresa M. Beiner, The Misuse of Summary Judgment in Hostile Environment Cases, 34 Wake Forest L. 
Rev. 71, 72–73 (1999) (arguing that courts became increasingly hostile to Title VII harassment cases 
after filings of such claims increased after 1991); Anand Swaminathan, The Rubric of Force: Employment 
Discrimination in the Context of Subtle Biases and Judicial Hostility, 3 The Modern Am. 21, 26 (2007) 
(discussing judicial hostility toward employment discrimination cases during the 1990s).
39. See Bennett, supra note 31, at 697–700; Patricia M. Wald, Summary Judgment at Sixty, 76 Tex. L. Rev. 
1897, 1941 (1998) (“Its f lame lit by Matsushita, Anderson, and Celotex in 1986, and fueled by overloaded 
dockets of the last two decades, summary judgment has spread swiftly through the underbrush of 
undesirable cases, taking down some healthy trees as it goes.”).
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judgment denial rate for male magistrate judges. Among Article III judges, female 
district court judges appointed by Republican Presidents had the highest rate of 
summary judgment denials (35% of claims), followed closely by female district court 
judges appointed by Democratic Presidents, who denied summary judgment for 33% 
of the claims they considered.
 Male Article III judges appointed by Republican judges, who considered the 
most claims in the database (215 claims), had a much better summary judgment 
denial rate (32% of claims) than male judges appointed by Democratic Presidents, 
who denied summary judgment on only 25% of the 128 equal pay claims they 
considered. This may be partly explained by the large number of claims that were 
considered by male Reagan appointees (64 claims), who denied summary judgment 
on 42% claims. Compare that to more recent male appointees by George W. Bush, 
who denied summary judgment for 26% of claims, and male judges appointed by Bill 
Clinton, who denied summary judgment for 28% of claims. As described above, 
those judges who came to the bench during or after the 1990s tended to grant 
summary judgment on equal pay claims at a higher rate.
 It is difficult to pinpoint the reason that female judges are more likely to deny 
summary judgment on equal pay claims. Overall, they are more likely to find disputes 
of material fact that preclude summary judgment. As compared to their male 
counterparts, compare the summary judgment records of women appointed as district 
court judges by George W. Bush, who denied 37% of summary judgment motions (7 
out of 19 claims), and women appointed by Bill Clinton, who denied 30% of summary 
judgment motions (14 out of 46 claims). Of course, the news is not completely good 
here: although they deny summary judgment more frequently than their male 
brethren, female judges are dismissing the majority of equal pay claims at the 
summary judgment stage. Their more favorable summary judgment record, however, 
demonstrates the importance of appointing more women, regardless of political 
affiliation, to the federal judiciary.
Table 7: District Court Summary Judgment Disposition on Equal Pay Claims by 
Gender of Judge
Summary Judgment 
Granted
Summary Judgment 
Denied
Gender of 
Judge
Number Percentage Number Percentage Total 
Claims
Male 271 70% 115 30% 386
Female 70 61% 44 39% 114
Total 341 68% 159 32% 500
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iV. WhY is sUMMarY JUdgMEnt grantEd sO OftEn On EQUaL paY CLaiMs?
 The key question for policymakers and employee advocates, of course, is why 
summary judgment is granted on the vast majority of equal pay claims—typically 
regardless of the characteristics of the judge and geographic location of the court. 
Could it really be that reasonable juries could not find pay discrimination in most 
equal pay cases? Is there something about the structure of the EPA itself that prevents 
so many plaintiffs from reaching a jury in these cases?
 To isolate the reason why summary judgment was granted by a court, I examined 
the court’s reasoning with respect to the two key stages of analyzing an equal pay 
claim: (1) the prima facie case and (2) the employer’s affirmative defenses. In addition, 
I tracked whether the plaintiff brought other types of Title VII discrimination claims 
together with the EPA claim as a way to try to determine whether the case focused 
centrally on pay discrimination, or whether the equal pay claim was a weaker claim 
tacked on to a complaint that primarily concerned another type of discrimination. 
 A. The Key Barrier: The Prima Facie Standard
 A plaintiff satisfies the prima facie standard under the EPA by showing that she 
and an employee of the opposite sex44 received unequal pay for “equal work on jobs 
the performance of which requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which 
were performed under similar working conditions.”45 All three factors—skill, effort, 
and responsibility—must be satisfied. The compared jobs need not be identical in all 
respects, but only “substantially equal.”46 The Act’s implementing regulations counsel 
that what constitutes substantially equal work “cannot be precisely defined.”47 As 
explained by one federal circuit court, the “court must compare the jobs in question 
in light of the full factual situation and the broad remedial purpose of the statute.”48 
At the prima facie stage, the analysis focuses solely on the compared jobs, not on the 
individuals holding those jobs.49
 As described above, the prima facie standard under the EPA is defined in broad 
terms and requires an intricate factual examination of the compared jobs to determine 
whether the performance of the work requires substantially equal “skill, effort, and 
responsibility.” The regulatory definitions of these terms allow for differences in the 
type of work performed. For example, determining “equal responsibility” requires an 
examination of the relative degree of accountability and importance of the job function 
44. The comparator can be a current co-worker or a predecessor or successor who performed substantially 
equal work.
45. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (2006).
46. 29 C.F.R. § 1620.13(a) (2011).
47. Id. § 1620.14(a).
48. EEOC v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 653 F.2d 1243, 1245 (8th Cir. 1981) (citing 29 C.F.R. 
§ 1620.114–.132 (2011)).
49. Miranda v. B&B Cash Grocery Store, Inc., 975 F.2d 1518, 1533 (11th Cir. 1992); see also Mulhall v. 
Advance Sec., Inc., 19 F.3d 586, 594 (11th Cir. 1994) (“[I]ndividual employee qualifications are relevant 
only to defendant’s affirmative defenses.”) (quoting Brock v. Ga. Sw. Coll., 765 F.2d 1026 (11th Cir. 1985)).
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those judges who came to the bench during or after the 1990s tended to grant 
summary judgment on equal pay claims at a higher rate.
 It is difficult to pinpoint the reason that female judges are more likely to deny 
summary judgment on equal pay claims. Overall, they are more likely to find disputes 
of material fact that preclude summary judgment. As compared to their male 
counterparts, compare the summary judgment records of women appointed as district 
court judges by George W. Bush, who denied 37% of summary judgment motions (7 
out of 19 claims), and women appointed by Bill Clinton, who denied 30% of summary 
judgment motions (14 out of 46 claims). Of course, the news is not completely good 
here: although they deny summary judgment more frequently than their male 
brethren, female judges are dismissing the majority of equal pay claims at the 
summary judgment stage. Their more favorable summary judgment record, however, 
demonstrates the importance of appointing more women, regardless of political 
affiliation, to the federal judiciary.
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to the employer: “The equal pay standard applies to jobs the performance of which 
requires equal responsibility. Responsibility is concerned with the degree of 
accountability required in the performance of the job, with emphasis on the importance 
of the job obligation.”50
 The definition of “equal effort” likewise requires a factual judgment about the 
amount and degree of exertion required to perform the jobs in question. Jobs can be 
equal even if the effort is exerted in different ways:
The jobs to which the equal pay standard is applicable are jobs that require 
equal effort to perform. Where substantial differences exist in the amount or 
degree of effort required to be expended in the performance of jobs, the equal 
pay standard cannot apply even though the jobs may be equal in all other 
respects. Effort is concerned with the measurement of the physical or mental 
exertion needed for the performance of a job. Job factors which cause mental 
fatigue and stress, as well as those which alleviate fatigue, are to be considered 
in determining the effort required by the job. “Effort” encompasses the total 
requirements of a job. Where jobs are otherwise equal under the EPA, and 
there is no substantial difference in the amount or degree of effort which must 
be expended in performing the jobs under comparison, the jobs may require 
equal effort in their performance even though the effort may be exerted in 
different ways on the two jobs. Differences only in the kind of effort required 
to be expended in such a situation will not justify wage differentials.51
Finally, the regulations explain “equal skill” based on the “amount or degree” of skill:
The jobs to which the equal pay standard is applicable are jobs requiring equal 
skill in their performance. Where the amount or degree of skill required to 
perform one job is substantially greater than that required to perform another 
job, the equal pay standard cannot apply even though the jobs may be equal in 
all other respects. Skill includes consideration of such factors as experience, 
training, education, and ability. It must be measured in terms of the performance 
requirements of the job. If an employee must have essentially the same skill in 
order to perform either of two jobs, the jobs will qualify under the EPA as jobs 
the performance of which requires equal skill, even though the employee in 
one of the jobs may not exercise the required skill as frequently or during as 
much of his or her working time as the employee in the other job. Possession of 
a skill not needed to meet the requirements of the job cannot be considered in making 
a determination regarding equality of skill. The efficiency of the employee’s 
performance in the job is not in itself an appropriate factor to consider in 
evaluating skill.52
 In prior scholarship, I have argued that the EPA’s prima facie standard has 
become a stumbling block for women filing equal pay claims.53 Rather than using a 
pragmatic assessment of the “substantially equal” standard—which permits some 
50. 29 C.F.R. § 1620.17(a) (2011). 
51. Id. § 1620.16(a).
52. 29 C.F.R. § 1620.15(a) (2011) (emphasis added).
53. Eisenberg, supra note 5, at 46–52.
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differences in the compared jobs—some courts have required strict identity among 
the compared jobs or imposed their own vision of “equal work” without applying the 
EPA’s regulatory definitions. The analysis of recent district court cases confirms this 
concern. For nearly half of the claims in the database (247 out of 500, or 49%), the 
court found that the plaintiff had failed to make a prima facie showing of equal work 
and granted summary judgment on the claim.
 Most courts—especially in the unpublished decisions—granted summary 
judgment with only a cursory explanation and little-to-no analysis of the equal work 
standard. I determined the extent to which the court cited or analyzed the statutory 
factors of substantially equal skill, effort, and responsibility. Only 15% (76 out of 
500) of the opinions analyzed the equal work factors comprehensively by citing the 
regulatory definitions and applying them systematically to the compared positions.54 
In these cases, the ratio of summary judgment denials and grants was more equal, 
with courts denying 45% of motions and granting 55%. Another 229 cases cited or 
briefly mentioned some portion of the equal work regulatory standard, but did not 
analyze and apply the factors in a comprehensive way.55 Summary judgment was 
granted in the cases that “somewhat” analyzed the equal pay factors 63% of the time, 
and denied 37%.
 For the remaining 195 cases that did not cite or analyze the components of the 
equal work standard at all, summary judgment grants were considerably higher: 79% 
of claims.56 In some of these cases, the lack of reference to the regulatory standards 
can be explained because, in eighteen cases, the defendant did not dispute that the 
plaintiff satisfied the prima facie showing and, in twenty-two cases, the court 
assumed that the plaintiff met the equal work standard.
 The finding that courts denied summary judgment more frequently when they 
actually cited or described the EPA’s regulatory definitions instructs that plaintiffs 
should ensure that they educate the court about the regulatory definitions of 
substantially equal skill, effort, and responsibility. Plaintiffs should explain to the 
court why factual disputes on these broad concepts should be decided by the jury, and 
why a reasonable jury could find that the compared jobs satisfy each prong of skill, 
responsibility, and effort. Without proper grounding in the nuanced, fact-intensive 
regulatory definitions of “equal work,” courts may be more likely to apply their own 
judgments about what constitutes “equal work.” Or—at the employer’s urging—courts 
may err on the side of requiring strict equality of the jobs in all respects.
54. For examples of decisions in which courts described the nuanced factual nature of the equal pay standard 
and cited the regulatory definitions of equal skill, responsibility, and effort, see Wildi v. Alle-Kiski Med. 
Ctr., 659 F. Supp. 2d 640 (W.D. Pa. 2009), Griffiths v. Winnebago Indus., Inc., 369 F. Supp. 2d 1063 
(N.D. Iowa 2005), and Brickey v. Emplrs. Reassurance Corp., 293 F. Supp. 2d 1227 (D. Kan. 2003).
55. For examples of cases in which the court analyzed the equal pay factors to some extent, see Rollins v. 
Ala. Cmty. Coll. Sys., 814 F. Supp. 2d 1250 (M.D. Ala. 2011), Denman v. Youngstown State Univ., 545 F. 
Supp. 2d 671 (N.D. Ohio 2008), and Garner v. Motorola, Inc., 95 F. Supp. 2d 1069 (D. Ariz. 2000).
56. See, e.g., Converse v. Okla. City, 649 F. Supp. 2d 1310, 1320 (W.D. Okla. 2009); Rallins v. Ohio State 
Univ., 191 F. Supp. 2d 920 (S.D. Ohio 2002).
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 Consider the example of a district court case from the Western District of Texas, 
Georgen-Saad v. Texas Mutual Insurance Co., in which the judge said that an equal pay 
claim by a female senior vice president of finance could “not be taken seriously.”57 
Although a pragmatic application of the substantially equal standard under the Act 
may apply to executives in different departments,58 the district court judge applied his 
own conception of appropriate executive pay, reasoning that subjecting high-level 
compensation to scrutiny was “simply beyond the pale.”59 He wrote:
In cases such as these, no judge or jury should be allowed to second guess the 
complex remuneration decisions of businesses that necessarily involve a 
unique assessment of experience, training, ability, education, interpersonal 
skills, market forces, performance, tenure, etc. Requiring Defendant and 
other companies to either pay senior executives the same amount or to come 
to court to justify their failure to do so is simply beyond the pale. In a perfect 
world, we would be able to grasp the complexities of such calculations and 
produce a formula that would bring forth the exact amount that any person 
should be paid at any moment in time. We do not live in such a world.60
 In this case, the judge’s own belief that senior executive pay should be “off limits” 
from scrutiny f lew in the face of the requirements of the EPA. Under the fact-based 
standard in the Act, a reasonable jury could indeed conclude that, despite working in 
different departments, these senior executives were performing work that required 
substantially equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and could reject the employer’s 
purported reasons for paying a female executive less than the men on the executive 
team. Of course, a reasonable jury could also agree with the judge’s assessment that 
these positions were not substantially equal. The point is that a district court judge 
should not be making factual judgment calls about whether compared jobs require 
substantially equal skills, effort, and responsibility at the summary judgment stage.
 To the extent discernible from the decisions, I also evaluated the reasons courts 
found that plaintiffs failed to make a prima facie showing. For eighty-nine (36%) of 
the 247 claims in which no prima facie case was found, the plaintiff simply failed to 
make a facial prima facie case. I labeled these claims as “weak” because, according to 
the court’s decision, the plaintiff did not mount even a minimal showing of a 
comparator of the opposite sex, a pay disparity, or work requiring substantially equal 
57. 195 F. Supp. 2d 853, 857 (W.D. Tex. 2002).
58. See, e.g., Simpson v. Merch. & Planters Bank, 441 F.3d 572, 578 (8th Cir. 2006) (holding that vice 
presidents who did not perform identical jobs were substantially equal); Crabtree v. Baptist Hosp. of 
Gadsden, Inc., 749 F.2d 1501 (11th Cir. 1985) (finding that assistant vice presidents who had different 
areas of departmental responsibility could be compared under the EPA); Denman v. Youngstown State 
Univ., 545 F. Supp. 2d 671, 677 (N.D. Ohio 2008) (holding that the general counsel and the rest of the 
university president’s cabinet performed substantially equal work, even though they oversaw different 
areas of the university); Rinaldi v. World Book, Inc., No. 00-C-3573, 2001 WL 477145, at *9 (N.D. Ill. 
May 3, 2001) (holding vice presidents in different departments were substantially equal because they 
had a common core of administrative tasks).
59. Georgen-Saad, 195 F. Supp. 2d at 857.
60. Id.
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skills, effort, and responsibility. In addition, eight claims were dismissed because of 
statute of limitations issues.61 In thirty-eight cases, the plaintiff failed to show a pay 
disparity. It is, of course, odd that a plaintiff would file an equal pay claim without 
evidence of a pay disparity. One possible explanation for this phenomenon is the 
prevalence of pay secrecy in the workplace—plaintiffs may not know the full extent 
of pay disparities until after discovery.62 These cases are examples of the appropriate 
use of summary judgment by the court to weed out claims that fail to satisfy basic 
prima facie pleading standards.
 For the other 112 claims (45%) for which summary judgment was granted based 
on the lack of a prima facie showing, courts typically cited a laundry list of reasons 
that the prima facie case was insufficient, or simply stated in a conclusory way that 
the compared jobs did not require equal work, without identifying a specific reason. 
Some cases were dismissed for multiple reasons (for example, the court found that 
both the skill and responsibility prongs were not satisfied). For twenty claims, the 
court found that the plaintiff had identified an improper comparator. The court 
found a lack of equal effort for 38 claims, a lack of equal responsibility for 104 claims, 
a lack of equal skill in 72 cases, and no similar working conditions in 15 cases. In 
other words, plaintiffs had a somewhat easier time convincing the court that the 
compared jobs required equal effort (physical or mental exertion), but courts were less 
persuaded that the jobs in question required substantially equal skill, and were even 
more skeptical that they entailed equal responsibility.
 Surviving the prima facie threshold is a critical step. In the small slice of cases in 
which the court found that the prima facie standard was satisfied (185 out of 500 
claims), summary judgment was denied for 144 claims (79%). This is an important 
finding because most legislative proposals to amend the EPA focus on narrowing the 
statute’s defenses, not modernizing the prima facie standard. For example, the Paycheck 
Fairness Act,63 which has come close to passing but continues to fail in Congress, 
focused primarily on tightening the defenses available to employers under the EPA. It 
does not, however, address the barrier presented by the prima facie threshold.
 With most plaintiffs losing equal pay claims at the starting gate, courts typically 
do not even reach the merits of the employer’s defenses. This grassroots picture of 
what is happening in equal pay litigation argues in favor of a more workable definition 
of equal work.
61. The statute of limitations under the EPA is two years, or three years if the plaintiff proves a willful 
violation. 29 U.S.C. § 255(a) (2006). Unlike Title VII claims, plaintiffs may file EPA claims directly in 
court and need not exhaust the administrative process with the EEOC. Id.
62. For a discussion of pay transparency as a potential tool to reduce pay discrimination against women, see 
Deborah Thompson Eisenberg, Money, Sex, and Sunshine: A Market-Based Approach to Pay Discrimination, 
43 Ariz. St. L.J. 951 (2011).
63. H.R. 1519, 112th Cong. (1st Sess. 2011).
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 B. The Second Barrier: Courts Give Employers the Benefit of the Doubt on Defenses
 If the plaintiff satisfies the prima facie showing under the EPA, pay discrimination 
is presumed and the burden shifts to the employer to prove that the pay disparity 
resulted from one of four affirmative defenses enumerated in the Act: “(i) a seniority 
system; (ii) a merit system; (iii) a system which measures earnings by quantity or 
quality of production; or (iv) a differential based on any other factor other than sex.”64 
Although the prima facie standards under the EPA and Title VII are different, the 
EPA’s defenses are also applicable to Title VII pay discrimination claims.65
 By far, the most common defense asserted by employers in equal pay cases was 
the catchall “any factor other than sex” (FOS) defense, which was asserted for 246 
claims—nearly half (49%) of the database. Surprisingly, a merit system was asserted 
for only sixteen claims; a formal seniority system only nine times; and a system which 
measures earnings by quantity or quality of production zero times. In 202 cases, the 
employer’s defense was not discernable from the opinion, typically because summary 
judgment was granted due to the lack of a prima facie case or another reason unrelated 
to the employer’s defenses.
 In the 246 cases in which the employer asserted a FOS defense, summary 
judgment was denied in 43% and granted in the other 57%. Employers typically 
asserted a long list of reasons for pay disparities, so isolating a particular type of FOS 
defense that is more or less successful was a difficult task, particularly given the 
sparse record offered in many summary judgment opinions at the district court stage. 
I tracked several different types of common FOS defenses to test their success rates, 
including: (1) the compared employees’ relative length of service or “informal 
seniority”; (2) factors that concerned only the qualifications of the plaintiff, such as 
experience, education, or performance; (3) “market forces” or “business judgment”; 
and (4) the prior or negotiated starting salaries of the plaintiff and her comparator.
 FOS defenses based on the employee’s length of service or “informal seniority” 
were asserted for only nineteen claims and were typically successful, resulting in 
summary judgment 68% of the time (thirteen of the nineteen claims). FOS defenses 
that focused solely on the relative qualifications or performance of the plaintiff and 
her comparator were present in 124 cases. Courts granted summary judgment in 
which a qualifications-based FOS defense was asserted 56% of the time, and denied 
summary judgment on 44% of the claims.
 Defenses such as longer service to the company and superior qualifications appeal 
to common sense and are widely accepted, and often appropriate, reasons for pay 
disparities in the workplace. Nevertheless, these defenses involve judgment calls 
about the employer’s credibility that are better resolved by a jury. It can be tempting 
to give the employer the benefit of the doubt on such justifications. At the summary 
judgment stage, however, evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the 
64. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (2006).
65. Cnty. of Wash. v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 171 (1981) (holding that the EPA’s defenses are applicable to 
Title VII pay discrimination claims).
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plaintiff, not an employer moving for summary judgment who bears the burden of 
persuasion on affirmative defenses.
 Defenses involving “market forces” and prior salaries are particularly controversial, 
with some arguing that the EPA prohibits such defenses because they are based on 
the stereotype that women are willing to work the same jobs for less pay.66 Courts are 
split on whether the “factor other than sex” defenses must be job-related and 
consistent with business necessity, with the EEOC and a majority of circuits holding 
that they must, and the minority holding the opposite view. The split in authority on 
the appropriateness of “market forces” defenses is evident in the twenty-five cases in 
this study in which employers asserted market-based defenses, with courts denying 
summary judgment for 48% of such claims, and granting it for 52% of them. 
Similarly, in the seventy-one cases in which the prior salary of the plaintiff and her 
comparator—or better pay negotiation results by the comparator—were defenses, 
courts denied summary judgment for 46% and granted it for 53% of claims.
 The relatively even split between summary judgment grants and denials when 
employers asserted FOS defenses suggests that courts are rejecting these fact-bound 
defenses nearly half of the time they are raised at the summary judgment stage. The 
question is why slightly more than half of these defenses are still being accepted by 
district court judges at the summary judgment stage given the significant burden on 
the employer to prove an affirmative defense under the EPA. Many of the cases in 
which employers asserted “business judgment” as a justification for pay disparities 
involved factual judgment calls about whether variations in the comparators’ experience 
and qualifications justified pay disparities. For example, should the fact that a male 
employee has a higher education be relevant to a low-wage job for which such education 
is not a required qualification?67 Can an employer’s financial troubles justify pay 
disparities that otherwise might violate the EPA?68 Does the fact that a woman accepts 
a salary at lower than her market rate, and a man accepts a salary higher than his 
market rate, justify pay disparities between otherwise substantially equal positions?69 
Resolution of these types of issues is more appropriately left to the jury, which can 
better evaluate the credibility of the employer’s asserted affirmative defenses.
 C. Other Title VII Claims
 Plaintiffs asserted a Title VII wage discrimination claim together with their 
EPA claims in 217 (43%) cases in the database. Courts typically treat EPA and Title 
VII pay claims the same, granting summary judgment at roughly the same rate for 
each statute. However, plaintiffs may prevail under one statute and lose on the other. 
In particular, as described above, if the plaintiff can make a prima facie showing 
under the EPA, the employer’s intent is no longer relevant (as it would be in a Title 
66. See Eisenberg, supra note 62, at 964–69 (discussing the evolution of market defenses in equal pay cases).
67. Warren v. Solo Cup Co., No. 04-2270, 2006 WL 2460763 (C.D. Ill. Aug. 23, 2006).
68. Shannon v. Hotel Emps. & Rest. Emps. Int’l Union, No. 01 C 9711, 2005 WL 2387689 (N.D. Ill. 
Sept. 22, 2005).
69. Drum v. Lesson Elec. Corp., 550 F. Supp. 2d 1071 (2008), rev’d, 565 F.3d 1071 (8th Cir. 2009). 
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VII case) and so the burden of persuasion then shifts to the employer to prove an 
affirmative defense.70 As one district court noted, this can lead to the “curious result” 
of courts granting summary judgment against Title VII sex discrimination claims, 
but denying it on Equal Pay Act claims.71
 Courts granted summary judgment on the Title VII pay discrimination claims 
68% of the time (147 claims) and denied it 32% of the time (70 claims). In three 
cases, the court granted summary judgment on the EPA claim but denied summary 
judgment on the Title VII claim,72 and in fifteen cases the court denied summary 
judgment on the EPA claim but granted summary judgment on Title VII pay 
discrimination.73
 A majority of plaintiffs (64%) asserted a non-wage Title VII sex discrimination 
claim together with the EPA claim. To the extent that the other claim was discernable 
from the court’s opinion, I tracked both the type of discrimination alleged and the 
summary judgment outcome for the other Title VII claims.
 Because the collection of cases for this database targeted EPA claims, and not 
Title VII sex discrimination cases more generally, the results do not ref lect how 
district courts have decided summary judgment motions in all Title VII sex 
discrimination cases over the past decade. But this glimpse of summary judgment 
dispositions for Title VII claims filed together with equal pay claims paints a very 
bleak picture for Title VII claims more generally, with summary judgment grant 
rates of 67% for sexual harassment claims; 73% for retaliation, termination, and 
demotion claims; 90–100% for disparate impact and pattern and practice claims; and 
rates exceeding 80% for other types of Title VII claims. Table 8 reflects the summary 
judgment disposition rates for Title VII claims brought together with equal pay 
claims.
70. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
71. Alford v. Cosmyl, Inc., 209 F. Supp. 2d 1361, 1372 n.9 (M.D. Ga. 2002).
72. Smith v. Voorhees Coll., C/A No. 5:05-1911-RBH-B/M, 2007 WL 2822266 (D. S.C. July 14, 2007) 
(two collective action claims); Lewis v. Smith, 255 F. Supp. 2d 1054 (D. Ariz. 2003).
73. Butler v. N.Y. Health & Racquet Club, 768 F. Supp. 2d 516 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); Mayden v. Superior 
Ambulance Serv., Inc., 647 F. Supp. 2d 1014 (N.D. Ind. 2009); Harris v. Auxilium Pharm., Inc., 664 F. 
Supp. 2d 711 (S.D. Tex. 2009); Vereen v. Woodland Hills Sch. Dist., No. CV 06-462, 2008 WL 
794451 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 24, 2008); Chevola v. Cellco P’ship, No. 8:06-cv-1312-T-30MAP, 2008 WL 
298993 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 1, 2008); Collins v. Landmark Military Newspapers, Inc., Civil No. 2:06cv342, 
2007 WL 2301549 (E.D. Va. Aug. 6, 2007); Hankins v. Title Max of Ala., Inc., No. Civ.A.05 AR 
00905 S, 2006 WL 4393576 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 26, 2006); David v. Comtech PST Corp., No. CV 
03-6480(JO), 2006 WL 2713936 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 2006); Dove v. Depuy Orthopedics, No. 
1:03-CV-379RM, 2005 WL 1683980 (N.D. Ind. July 18, 2005); Cox v. Quick & Reilly, Inc., 401 F. 
Supp. 2d 203 (N.D.N.Y. 2005); Cuffee v. Dover Wipes Co., 334 F. Supp. 2d 565 (D. Del. 2004); Simpri 
v. City of New York, No. 00 Civ. 6712(SAS), 2003 WL 23095554 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 30, 2003); Wilks v. 
Shelby Cnty. Gov’t, No. 00-2143-G-MI/A, 2002 WL 34672828 (W.D. Tenn. Feb. 5, 2002); Woods v. 
Univ. of South, No. 4:00-CV-16, 2001 WL 34079320 (E.D. Tenn. Nov. 8, 2001); Hildebrant v. Ill. 
Dep’t of Nat. Res., 132 F. Supp. 2d (C.D. Ill. 2001).
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Table 8: District Court Summary Judgment Disposition of Title VII Claims Brought 
with Equal Pay Act Claims, 2000–2011
Summary Judgment 
Denied
Summary Judgment 
Granted
Type of Title VII Claim Total Number Percent Number Percent
Pay discrimination 217 70 32% 147 68%
Retaliation 201 55 27% 146 73%
Termination/discharge 115 31 27% 84 73%
Hostile work environment 108 20 19% 88 81%
Failure to promote 79 14 18% 65 82%
Other disparate treatment 77 6 8% 71 92%
Constructive discharge 29 4 14% 25 86%
Demotion/suspension 11 3 27% 8 73%
Disparate impact 10 1 10% 9 90%
Sexual harassment 6 2 33% 4 67%
Pattern and practice 5 0 0% 5 100%
Total 858 206 24% 652 76%
V. COnCLUsiOn
 This case study shows that the vast majority of plaintiffs who file equal pay claims 
in federal district courts are losing their cases at the summary judgment stage. The 
high rate of summary judgment grants for such fact-intensive claims suggests that 
summary judgment is being overused by most federal district courts in equal pay 
cases. There is some room for hope. After the summary judgment grant rate reached 
a high of 78% in 2008, it declined back to 64% in 2011—after the Lilly Ledbetter Act 
was enacted and the issue of equal pay for equal work was in the political spotlight.74
 Nevertheless, this empirical snapshot portends bleak prospects for women who 
seek court redress for pay discrimination. More legislative attention should be 
focused on the major hurdles for most women in the EPA cases: the prima facie 
standard of equal work, which many courts interpret too strictly, and the factor other 
than sex defense, which many courts apply too leniently. Nearly half of all equal pay 
cases are kicked out on summary judgment because the judge found that the plaintiff 
failed to meet the prima facie threshold. Those that survive that hurdle may then 
falter based on defenses in which courts sometimes improperly give the employer the 
benefit of the doubt. Judges should be more mindful of the pragmatic regulatory 
definitions of substantially equal work under the EPA and allow juries to resolve 
factual disputes about the nature of the work involved and the credibility of the 
employer’s asserted justifications for pay disparities.
74. Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (2009).
